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NOTE
Syntax or Experience: What Should
Determine If Sex Trafficking Qualifies as a
Crime of Violence?
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.
Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016)

Britteny Pfleger*

I. INTRODUCTION
The residents of Lebanon, Missouri, a small town in the southern part of
the state, certainly did not believe their kind, generous neighbors were in fact
sadistic slave owners.1 Yet such brutality existed, lurking beneath one such
family’s gentle and caring façade.2 In what was later described as the most
horrific case of sex trafficking ever prosecuted in the state, a resident couple
housed a mentally deficient runaway teenage girl with a troubled past and
forced her to sign a never-ending sex-slave contract.3 “Master Ed” branded
his victim with a bar code tattoo, marking her as his property, and forced her
to have sex with him and several “customers.”4 Over the next six years, Master Ed subjected the girl to waterboarding, electrocution, and beatings.5 He
repeatedly threatened his victim with a gun, exhibiting his ability to kill her if
she did not comply.6 The trafficking was not discovered until 2009, when the
*

B.S.B.A. in Business Administration – International Business, University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2017. I would
like to thank Professor Mary Beck for her enthusiastic guidance throughout the development of this Note. I would also like to thank Nanette Ward, Education and Survivor Outreach Coordinator for the Central Missouri Stop Human Trafficking Coalition,
who provided me with extensive research and insight. A special thank you to my
mentors in the legal field, Dean Robert Bailey, Mr. Roger Geary, and the Honorable
Steven C. Montgomery, for their exceptional advice over the years. Finally, I would
like to thank my family for their encouragement and unwavering support.
1. See Todd C. Frankel, A Missouri Town’s Doubts About a Sex Torture Case,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crimeand-courts/a-missouri-town-s-doubts-about-a-sex-torture-case/article_030742917988-59e7-9fd1-4d81b5088e56.html.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Indictment at 9, United States v. Bagley, No. 10-00244-01-CR-W-DW
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011).
5. Id. at 7, 12.
6. Id. at 13.
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victim went into cardiac arrest after one of Master Ed’s torture sessions, resulting in her hospitalization and emergency treatment.7
While the circumstances in the Lebanon case were especially horrific,
the practice of sex trafficking is not unique. The National Human Trafficking
Resource Center (“NHTRC”) reported 4136 cases of sex trafficking in the
United States in 2015,8 including 155 cases in Missouri between 2013 and
2015.9 To combat these alarming statistics, Congress enacted the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) in 2000 to “ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers.”10 The TVPA criminalizes the trafficking of people in
the commercial sex industry by force, fraud, or coercion.11 A conviction under this statute subjects a defendant to a minimum of fifteen years in federal
prison.12
Separately, Congress authorized federal prosecutors to charge defendants who possess a gun while committing a “crime of violence” under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c).13 A conviction under this statute is punishable by at least
five years, served in addition to the underlying crime of violence.14 To convict a defendant under § 924(c), prosecutors must show (1) the defendant
possessed or used a gun in the commission of his or her crime and (2) the
crime committed is characterized as a “crime of violence.”15 Prior to 2015,
federal courts agreed the sex trafficking of minors was a “crime of violence.”16 However, in August 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

7. Id. at 19.
8. Data Breakdown: United States Report 1/1/2015 – 12/31/2015, NAT’L

HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
RESOURCE
CTR.,
http://traffickingresourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/NHTRC%202015%20United%2
0States%20Report%20-%20USA%20-%2001.01.15%20-%2012.31.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017). The NHTRC is a national anti-trafficking hotline and resource center.
Mission,
NAT’L
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
RESOURCE
CTR.,
https://traffickingresourcecenter.org/mission (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
9. Missouri,
NAT’L
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
RESOURCE
CTR.,
https://traffickingresourcecenter.org/state/missouri (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). The
Missouri hotline uncovered fifty-eight cases of sex trafficking and one case of sex and
labor trafficking in 2015. Id. In 2014, thirty-nine cases of sex trafficking and one
case of sex and labor trafficking were reported. Id. In 2013, the NHTRC found fiftythree cases of sex trafficking and three cases of sex and labor trafficking. Id. It is
important to note these statistics are not cumulative, and each may involve multiple
victims. Id.
10. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012).
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a) (West 2016).
12. Id. § 1591(b)(1).
13. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A).
14. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
15. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A).
16. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Circuit went against this trend, declaring sex trafficking of an adult victim not
to be a crime of violence.17
This Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Fuertes, ultimately concluding that, contrary to the decision in Fuertes, sex
trafficking should be considered a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Part II of this Note details the acts of German Ventura, a defendant
charged with sex trafficking and possession of a gun during a crime of violence. Part III explores the purpose of § 924(c) and courts’ interpretations of
“crime of violence”; it then considers federal circuit courts’ bases for finding
sex trafficking under the TVPA to be a violent crime under a variety of statutes. Part IV summarizes the Fourth Circuit’s decision to depart from established precedent. Part V scrutinizes the court’s theory that sex trafficking
cannot be a violent crime, ultimately resolving that, while sex trafficking
should be considered a crime of violence, Congress must change the statute to
expressly reflect the violent nature of sex trafficking.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
By early 2008, German Ventura owned and operated several brothels
throughout Annapolis, Maryland, quickly becoming a top competitor in the
commercial sex industry.18 Ventura arranged for prostitutes to work in his
brothels on a weekly basis.19 The women communicated with Ventura by
phone, traveled to Washington, D.C., by bus, and were transported by Ventura or his employees to a brothel.20 Ventura charged customers, commonly
called johns, thirty dollars for fifteen minutes of sex and paid the women half
the gross receipts, minus expenses for food, hygiene products, and other trade
expenses.21
Ventura had a particularly violent relationship with Rebeca Duenas
Franco (“Duenas”), who Ventura pimped out to several johns over the course
of several years.22 Duenas, an undocumented worker with only a third grade
education,23 was under the control of another pimp when Ventura met her.24
Ventura extricated Duenas from the pimp’s employment and provided her
with a place to stay.25 Their relationship became sexual in nature, and Duenas subsequently gave birth to Ventura’s son.26
17. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016).
18. See id. at 491.
19. Id. at 490.
20. Id. at 491.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Brief of Appellee United States of America at 8, United States v. Fuertes,
805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-4755(L), 13-4931).
24. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 491.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Ventura soon reintroduced Duenas to prostitution by giving her a box of
condoms and telling Duenas to “go to work.”27 When Duenas resisted, Ventura beat her until she complied.28 While other women received payment for
their services, Duenas did not.29 Ventura continued to threaten and harm
Duenas, including beating her with a belt and cutting her foot when she refused to perform sexual acts.30 Through fear and control, Ventura held Duenas against her will.31
Duenas’s fear of Ventura grew as she witnessed other violent acts he
committed against others.32 Duenas observed Ventura threaten those he perceived as competitors by displaying weapons and making harassing phone
calls.33 She saw Ventura beat a woman who he believed had sent people to
rob one of his brothels.34 On another occasion, Duenas watched as Ventura
assaulted a male employee for threatening to go to the police.35 Perhaps most
terrifying, Duenas witnessed Ventura celebrating the murder of a competing
pimp, who he had previously threatened to kill.36 Ventura disclosed to Duenas that one of the prostitutes working for the murdered pimp had also been
killed during the crime.37
On November 15, 2010, following the serious assault of a competing
pimp, police arrested Ventura.38 Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted
Ventura on charges of conspiracy; transportation of individuals for prostitution; and sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion.39 In addition, the grand
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 16 (“RDF’s
knowledge of the violence directed at others, whether claimed, actual or threatened,
was undisputedly relevant evidence because this conduct contributed to a climate of
fear intentionally created by the defendants to compel RDF to continue to engage in
commercial sex acts.”).
33. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 492.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 24–26.
38. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 492.
39. Id. at 493. The seven-count indictment included charges of (1) “conspiracy
to transport an individual in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371”; (2) “transportation of individuals in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421”; and (3) “sex
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).” Id. In
addition, Ventura was individually charged with (1) “coercing or enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2422(a)”; (2) “transportation of individuals in interstate commerce for the
purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421”; and (3) “possession and use
of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).”
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jury charged Ventura with possession and use of a firearm in relation to a
crime of violence based on the sex trafficking charge.40
Proceeding to trial, a jury found Ventura guilty on all counts.41 Denying
Ventura’s post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal or new trial, the district
court sentenced Ventura to 420 months’ imprisonment: 360 months for the
several prostitution and sex trafficking counts and 60 months for the possession of a gun while committing the crime of sex trafficking.42 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury’s convictions on
all counts save one.43 In overturning Ventura’s conviction for possession and
use of a firearm to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the
court found sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion “is not a categorical
crime of violence.”44

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with the intention of preventing criminals from carrying and using firearms during the commission of
federal felonies.45 To convict a defendant under § 924(c), the court must first
find the underlying crime to be a “crime of violence” as defined by statute.46
Courts frequently look to similar provisions containing “crime of violence” or
“violent crime” language in making this determination.47 While circuit courts
have not evaluated sex trafficking under § 924(c), courts have evaluated this
issue under similar “crime of violence” clauses and concluded sex trafficking
qualifies as a violent crime.48

A. Defining Crimes of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and Similar
Statutes
Section 924(c) currently provides a mandatory minimum of five years’
imprisonment for “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such

Id. This Note analyzes only the possession and use of a firearm in relation to a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 493, 501.
43. Id. at 490.
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1171 (8th Cir. 1976).
46. 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
47. See infra Part III.A.
48. See infra Part III.A.
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crime, possesses a firearm.”49 A conviction under this statute must be served
consecutively to the underlying crime.50
Congress created two distinct definitions under which a felony may
qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).51 First, under the “force
clause,” a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another” is a crime of
violence.52 Second, the “residual clause” expresses that a felony will be considered a crime of violence if, “by its nature, [the felony] involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.”53 When determining whether
a crime fits within either “crime of violence” definition, courts commonly
look at (1) the defendant’s conviction of a particular crime and (2) the “statutory definition of the offense.”54 In most cases, the court cannot consider
particular facts of a defendant’s case when making the crime of violence determination.55
Application of this legal principle to § 924(c)’s force clause is straightforward: a crime that requires the use, attempt, or threat of force for conviction qualifies as a crime of violence.56 Conversely, when a statute defines a
felony using elements that “allow[] for both violent and nonviolent means of
commission, the offense is not a . . . crime of violence.”57
The Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a violent crime under the residual clause of § 924(c).58 Circuit courts have looked to similar
language in other statutes to evaluate specific crimes, including the criminal
code’s general definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the U.S. Sentencing
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

§ 924(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
Id. § 924(c)(3).
Id. § 924(c)(3)(A).
Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013) (“Sentencing courts
may ‘look only to the statutory definitions’ – i.e., the elements – of a defendant’s
prior offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those convictions.’” (quoting
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990))). The Descamps Court held that if
a felony statute is indivisible – it does not contain alternative elements – courts must
apply a categorical approach in making a crime of violence determination. Id. at
2281. On the rare occasion a felony statute contains alternative substantive offenses
that qualify as a violation, courts will apply a modified categorical approach. Id. at
2283.
55. Id. at 2283.
56. See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016).
57. Id.
58. See Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: The 18 U.S.C.
924(c) Tack-On in Cases Involving Drugs or Violence, CONG. RES. SERV. 3 (Sept. 16,
2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41412.pdf (“The Supreme Court has addressed several other aspects of § 924(c), but it has yet to decide what constitutes a
crime of violence for purposes of this section.”).
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Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) §4B1.2, and the Armed
Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).59
However, appellate decisions analyzing felonies as crimes of violence under
these assorted residual clauses have varied widely.60
The language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) parallels that of § 924(c).61 In Leocal
v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court asserted that if the felony encompasses a
“reckless disregard . . . to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime,” it is a crime of violence under §
16(b).62 In other words, if a person risks having to “use” physical force
against another person in the course of committing the felony, then it is a
crime of violence.63
The Court illustrated its point by analyzing the “classic example” of
burglary.64 It reasoned that burglary is a crime of violence because it “involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in
completing the crime,” not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless manner.65 By contrast, a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol cannot be considered a violent crime because the harm is
merely accidental or negligent, rather than reckless.66 Yet even after the
Court’s decision in Leocal, the circuit courts still vary in their crime of violence determinations.67
Another prominent residual clause can be found in the Sentencing
Guidelines. Under §4B1.1, judges can raise a defendant’s sentencing range
if: (1) the instant offense is a crime of violence, and (2) the defendant has at
least two prior felony convictions for either committing a violent crime or
59. Id. at 4–5.
60. Id. Compare United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (pos-

session of an unregistered pipe bomb was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
16), with United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1999) (possession of
a pipe bomb was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16).
61. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (defining crime of violence as “any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”), with § 924(c)(1)(3) (“‘[C]rime of violence’ means an offense that
is a felony and . . . that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.”).
62. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004).
63. Id. at 11 (“In no ‘ordinary or natural’ sense can it be said that a person risks
having to ‘use’ physical force against another person in the course of operating a
vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury.”).
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 11.
67. See generally Hon. Bertha A. Zuniga, Aggravated Felony Case Summary,
DOJ
(Nov.
15,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Aggravated_Felony_
Outline.pdf.
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possessing a controlled substance.68 The Sentencing Guidelines similarly
provide two definitions for “crimes of violence.”69 While the first definition
matches that of other “force” clauses, the second definition states a felony
that “[is a] burglary of a dwelling, arson or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another” is a “violent felony.”70 Interestingly, the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines lists, but does not limit itself to, additional
crimes it considers violent, including: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
forcible sex offenses, robbery, and extortionate extension of credit.71 While
this provides some guidance as to which crimes apply, circuit courts still vary
as to unenumerated felonies.
The ambiguity in applying the “crime of violence” provision carries
over to the ACCA. The ACCA almost perfectly mirrors the alternative definitions of “crime of violence” provided in the Sentencing Guidelines.72 Notably, the Supreme Court declared the ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague in 2015 and chastised its own ambiguous interpretations of
the clause over the past decade.73 The Court in Johnson v. United States felt
“the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a
crime to qualify as a violent felony” and criticized its application as “judgeimagined abstraction.”74 While the Court claimed this decision would not
affect the constitutionality of other residual clauses in nationwide criminal
codes, several circuits have applied the Johnson holding to other residual
clauses.75 Because of uncertainty among circuit courts regarding the validity
of residual clauses, the status of these clauses is now unclear.
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015). The Guidelines also indicate the defendant must be eighteen years old at the
time of conviction. Id.
69. Id. §4B1.2.
70. Id.
71. Id. §4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
72. Compare §4B1.2, with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
73. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (“Nine years’ experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause convinces us that we have
embarked upon a failed enterprise.”). The Court analyzed its previous holdings in
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137
(2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); and Sykes v. United States,
564 U.S. 1 (2011). Id. at 2558–60 (“[T]his Court’s repeated attempts and repeated
failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm
its hopeless indeterminacy.”).
74. Id. at 2558.
75. See Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Having carefully considered these principles and precedents, we agree with the Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits that 18 U.S.C. §16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable from the
ACCA’s residual clause and . . . must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of
Johnson.”); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e are convinced
that Johnson is equally applicable to the [] residual definition of crime of violence. . .
. [T]his nebulous provision, we conclude, denies due process of law.”); United States
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B. Sex Trafficking Statutes and Case Law
Congress passed the TVPA in 2012 “to combat trafficking in persons[,] .
. . to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect the
victims.”76 This legislation addressed, for the first time, trafficking in persons as a specific offense, criminalizing participation in sex trafficking by
force, fraud, or coercion.77 The question of whether a violation of the TVPA
qualifies as a crime of violence is relatively recent.78 The courts have addressed this question as to minors, and all concluded criminal sexual activity
with a minor is categorically a violent crime.79 Prior to Fuertes, no court had
decided whether criminal sex trafficking of an adult by force, fraud, or coercion qualified as a crime of violence.80

v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Applying Johnson’s reasoning
here, we conclude that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.”); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803
F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]hese uncertainties render [§ 16(b)] unconstitutionally vague.”) (footnote omitted), cert granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016) (mem.). But
see United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Johnson does not
require reversal of Taylor’s conviction, because several factors distinguish the ACCA
residual clause from § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d
670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“These distinctions mean that the concerns raised
by the Court in Johnson with respect to Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause
do not cause the same problems in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). . . . Thus, we
hold that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.”). In addition,
the Eighth Circuit has asked the attorneys in United States v. Taylor to brief whether
the Court’s holding in Johnson makes U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 unconstitutionally vague.
United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 932 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012).
77. Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal
Statutes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 1250 (2011) (“The TVPA of 2000 recognized for the
first time trafficking in persons as a specific offense.”). The statute also recognized
forced labor, trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, unlawful conduct with respect to documents, and attempting to commit any of these acts
as crimes under the TVPA. Id.
78. Id. at 1249.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is
surpassingly difficult to see how burglary could be treated as a violent crime yet child
trafficking exempted.”); United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he government is correct that violation of the statute creates a significant risk of
violence against the victim by the perpetrator . . . .”); United States v. Keelan, 786
F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Since the conduct encompassed by the elements of §
2422(b) involves a sex crime against a minor, the ordinary or generic violation of §
2422(b) involves a substantial risk the defendant may use physical force in the course
of committing the offense.”).
80. See Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 38–40
(comparing the reasons circuits have found sex trafficking of minors to be a crime of
violence with the physical risk of injury to adult victims).
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1. The Prosecution of Sex Traffickers: Developing Statutory Law
The TVPA recognizes human trafficking as “a contemporary manifestation of slavery.”81 In 2000, Congress estimated 50,000 women and children
were trafficked into the United States.82 In the congressional findings, legislators noted that traffickers target impoverished women and girls who lack
access to education and economic opportunities.83 Trafficked women and
girls “are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex acts,” including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, and imprisonment.84 Traffickers threaten their victims, claiming they will physically
harm the victims or others should the victims attempt to escape.85 Accordingly, Congress declared, “Trafficking includes all the elements of the crime of
forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of another person
in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion.”86
The TVPA defines sex trafficking as the use of force, fraud, or coercion,87 or any combination thereof, to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act.88 As prescribed by statute, a “commercial sex act” is “any sex
act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any
person.”89 Prohibited sex acts, such as the recruitment, enticement, providing
or benefiting from commercial sex trafficking, are punishable by no less than
fifteen years in prison.90
Prior to the TVPA, the only statute to prosecute sex traffickers fell under
the Mann Act.91 The Mann Act, originally passed in 1910, currently makes it
a felony to knowingly transport a person with the intent that person engage
“in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense.”92 Specifically, the Mann Act criminalizes the persuasion, induce81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

§ 7101(a).
Id. § 7101(b)(1).
Id. § 7101(b)(4).
Id. § 7101(b)(6).
Id. § 7101(b)(7).
Id. § 7101(b)(9).
Coercion is defined as (1) “threats of serious harm to or physical restraint
against any person”; (2) “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to
believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person”; or (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal
process.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(e)(2) (West 2016).
88. As indicated by statute, “force fraud and coercion are not separate elements
of the offense of sex trafficking” but are “alternate means to accomplish a single element.” See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1265 (quoting United States v. Paris, No. 03:06cr-64 (CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78418, at *36 (D. Conn. 2007)).
89. § 1591(e)(3).
90. Id. § 1591(b)(1).
91. See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1250.
92. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421(a); id. § 2422(a); see also Mattar, supra note 77, at
1250–52.
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ment, enticement, and coercion of said individuals, allowing the government
to prosecute sex traffickers.93 Interestingly, the Mann Act does not require
proof of force, fraud, or coercion, effectively lowering the burden of proof on
the government.94

2. Sex Trafficking as a Crime of Violence in Circuit Courts
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was the first court to address whether the sex trafficking of minors through interstate commerce constituted a violent crime for the purpose of categorizing the defendant as a
career offender.95 Over a two-year period, the defendant in United States v.
Williams caused a thirteen-year-old girl to travel from Massachusetts to
neighboring states to perform sex acts for money.96 The defendant argued his
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), transportation of a minor with intent to
engage in sexual activity, could not be considered a crime of violence because the defendant was not charged with personal sexual contact with the
girl.97 The First Circuit disagreed, claiming, “[I]t is common ground that
most ‘indecent sexual contact crimes perpetrated by adults against children
categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury.’”98 The court
reasoned that most illicit sexual activity between an adult and a minor occurs
in close quarters and is perpetuated by an adult upon a “smaller, weaker, and
less experienced” minor.99 The court concluded, “The fact that the appellant
was not personally intimate with the minor . . . does nothing to diminish the
risk that force might be used in carrying out the crime” because the defendant’s conduct “necessarily placed the minor in harm’s way.”100
Perhaps most similar to Fuertes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit decided in United States v. Willoughby that a conviction of sex trafficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 qualified as a “crime of violence”

93. § 2422(a) (“Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . to engage in prostitution, or
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”).
94. See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1251.
95. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2008).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2007)).
99. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998)).
100. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the same
question a year later in United States v. Patterson. 576 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2009).
Following the court in Williams, the court found a crime committed under § 2423(a)
created “a significant risk of violence against the victim by the perpetrator as well as
third parties.” Id. at 442. Though the crime does require an element of violence, the
court found the crime presented a sufficiently substantial risk to qualify under the
ACCA’s residual clause. Id.
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for a career criminal sentencing.101 In that case, the defendant took in a sixteen-year-old runaway girl and proceeded to have sex with her and sell her to
other johns.102 Terrified of and completely dependent on the defendant, the
girl felt she had no choice but to comply.103
The court held, “[T]he act of causing a minor to engage in prostitution –
even when the defendant’s act does itself not involve force – obviously does
present a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the victim.”104 The
court acknowledged the risk of physical injury from the act itself, including
violence from johns and the pimp.105 The constant risk of physical violence
loomed regardless of whether the pimp actually used force to cause the victim
to engage in sex because “there is always a serious risk he will use force afterward, if she disobeys his rules, fails to obtain a client, or for any number of
reasons.” 106
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed similar reasoning when finding the transportation of a minor in violation of the Mann
Act to be a crime of violence for purposes of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”).107 In United States v. Keelan, the defendant developed a
sexual relationship with one of his high school students over the course of
two years.108 When the defendant moved to Virginia to take a new teaching
job, he continued his relationship with the former student until the child gave
the defendant up to the police.109 A jury convicted the defendant of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity.110
In seeking to apply the MVRA, the federal prosecutor had to prove the
defendant committed a crime of violence that resulted in bodily injury, looking to § 16(b) to determine whether the offense was a crime of violence.111
The court, evaluating the ordinary violation of the statute, proclaimed a substantial risk of physical force always exists in order to ensure a child’s compliance.112 The court surmised that the defendant therefore committed a
crime of violence under § 16(b)’s residual clause and ordered the defendant to
pay restitution.113

101.
102.
103.
104.

742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 242 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4B1.2(a)(2)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 872–73 (11th Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 868.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 870.
111. Id. at 871–72.
112. Id. at 872.
113. Id.
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With courts unanimously declaring sex trafficking of minors to be a
crime of violence under a variety of statutes, it seems logical to similarly
qualify the sex trafficking of adults. However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In United States v. Fuertes, the Fourth Circuit unanimously concluded
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion could not be a crime of violence
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 942(c).114 In doing so, the court found the sex
trafficking statute did not conform to the force clause or the residual
clause.115 The court reversed Ventura’s conviction for possessing a gun during a crime of violence, reducing Ventura’s sentence by five years.116
The Fuentes court first evaluated whether sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion qualified categorically as a crime of violence under §
924(c)’s force clause.117 Citing Descamps v. United States, the court asserted
a crime could not be a crime of violence if the statute’s elements allow for
both violent and nonviolent commissions of the crime.118 The court reasoned
because 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) specifically allows for sex trafficking to be
committed by fraud alone, it can be committed non-violently.119 Therefore,
the court concluded sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion does not qualify as a categorical crime of violence under the force clause.120
Next, the court addressed whether the crime of sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s residual
clause.121 The government argued that even when the defendant commits the
crime of sex trafficking by fraud alone, victims still face a substantial risk of
injury from customers.122 The court rejected this analysis.123 Relying on the
statute’s language, the court reasoned the proper inquiry was not whether
there was a risk any person tangentially related to the offense would use
force.124 Rather, the court must inquire whether the defendant presented such
a substantial risk.125

114. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 501 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016).
115. See id. at 499–500.
116. Id. at 501 (“Ventura cannot be guilty of violating § 924(c), and yet he received an additional sixty months’ imprisonment for this offense.”).
117. Id. at 498–99.
118. Id. at 498.
119. Id. at 499.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 500.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 499.
125. Id.
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The court illustrated its point by examining burglary as a crime of violence.126 Employing Leocal v. Ashcroft, the court surmised burglary would
be covered as a crime of violence because there was a significant risk the
burglar would use force in completing the crime.127 Comparing this conclusion to the opposite outcome reached in Willoughby, the court explained the
Sentencing Guidelines, also used in Leocal, involved broader language than
18 U.S.C. § 16(b).128 Specifically, U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 “involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” while 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) limits the risk to only “during the course of committing the
offense.”129 Finding the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury that
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion is a violent crime, the Fourth Circuit vacated Ventura’s § 924(c) conviction.130

V. COMMENT
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fuertes exemplifies the common misperceptions prosecutors face when prosecuting sex traffickers.131 First, this
Part will address these misperceptions by looking at how traffickers use a mix
of physical violence, coercion, deception, and vulnerability to pressure their
victims into commercial sex.132 Next, this Part will consider the “substantial
risk of violence” analysis in Fuertes under a corrected sex trafficking lens,
concluding sex trafficking is a violent crime under the residual clause. This
Part then explores the future of sex trafficking as a violent crime given the
residual clause’s uncertain future in statutory law, ultimately resolving that
Congress must qualify a conviction of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion as forcible rape in the criminal statute.133

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501.
See Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Human Trafficking and Domestic Violence: A
Primer for Judges, 52 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2013). See also TASK FORCE ON TRAFFICKING
OF WOMEN & GIRLS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND
GIRLS 26 (2014), https://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/trafficking/report.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT].
132. See Janice G. Raymond & Donna M. Hughes, Sex Trafficking of Women in
the United States: International and Domestic Trends, DOJ 57–65 (Apr. 17, 2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187774.pdf.
133. While sex traffickers victimize both men and women, this Part focuses on
female sex trafficking reports and statistics for simplicity and easy reading. Any
pronouns will therefore refer to “her” throughout this Part.
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A. What Is Sex Trafficking? Violence, Manipulation, and Dependence
Sex trafficking is infamously recognized as the most common form of
modern-day slavery.134 It is the third largest and fastest-growing criminal
enterprise in the world,135 victimizing an estimated four and a half million
people globally.136 Traffickers operating in the United States frequently operate in solo or small-group operations, capable of running multi-state trafficking businesses and grossing into the millions of dollars.137
Violence is an intrinsic part of human sex trafficking.138 Traffickers use
physical force to initiate women into the world of commercial sex.139 They
then use violence to punish, threaten, intimidate, dominate, control, and isolate the victim.140 Traffickers will also use violence as a mechanism to obtain
their own sexual gratification.141
A 2001 study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice interviewed
domestic and international victims of sex trafficking and found “violence,
rape, robbery, kidnapping, and killings are normal occurrences for women in
prostitution.”142 The same study reported that 86% of the American women
interviewed and 53% of the international women interviewed experienced
physical abuse at the hands of their traffickers.143 These women experienced
violence such as “having [their] head and face split open, being punched until
[their] teeth were knocked out, pounded unconscious, hit with hangers,
choked, and pushed out of moving cars.”144 Traffickers often used weapons,
including guns, knives, sticks, and ropes.145 Importantly, these numbers are
consistently underreported and underestimated.146
Traffickers often rape their victims in order to ensure their compliance.147 Studies show between one-third and two-thirds of trafficked women
134. Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking, FBI
(Mar. 2011), https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/march/human-sex-trafficking (last visited Feb.
3, 2017).
135. Id.
136. Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/sex-trafficking
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
137. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 20.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 55.
140. Id. at 60–61.
141. Id. at 61.
142. Id. at 66.
143. Id. at 65.
144. Id. at 58–59.
145. Id. at 59.
146. Id. at 74. The researchers list several reasons why these numbers are in reality higher than statistics reflect, including: (1) “[n]ormalizing the violence in their
lives,” (2) “[r]eluctance to describe or speak about the violence for fear of retaliation
from the abuser,” and (3) “[s]hame in talking about what they were subjected to.” Id.
147. See Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16.
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reported being raped by traffickers and their clients.148 One such study, funded by the Department of Justice, revealed that 80% of the domestically trafficked interviewees, and almost 40% of the international interviewees, reported sexual assault at the hands of their traffickers.149 The FBI also recognized
that traffickers sometimes use gang rape as a means of gaining control over
their victims.150 Similar to reports of physical violence, sexual violence is
underreported in these studies.151
Researchers from another study followed almost 2000 sexually exploited women for thirty years.152 The study revealed that homicide was the leading cause of premature death.153 The rate of homicide for these women was
seven times higher than male taxicab drivers and fifty-one times higher than
the homicide rate for female liquor store workers (the two occupations with
the highest homicide rates in the country at the time of the study).154 The
study noted, “[N]o population of women studied previously has had a crude
mortality rate, standardized mortality ratio, or percentage of deaths due to
murder even approximating those observed in our cohort.”155
Traffickers also frequently threaten violence against the victim or her
family in order to gain compliance. In one study, 90% of American women
and 47% of international women reported verbal threats made by traffickers.156 In addition, both American and international women received threats
to their families.157 Victims see these threats as viable because traffickers
often belong to the same community as the victim and her loved ones.158
This type of coercion places victims in constant fear of danger.
Psychological coercion is a form of mental violence.159 Traffickers
readily admit to using this type of coercion as a method to maintain control of
their victims.160 A trafficker’s most effective method of recruitment is estab-

148. See REPORT, supra note 131, at 37 (citing Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution
and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 33 (2003)).
149. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9.
150. Walker-Rodriguez & Hill, supra note 134.
151. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 74.
152. REPORT, supra note 131, at 37 (citing John J. Potterat et al., Mortality in a
Long-Term Open Cohort of Prostitute Women, 159 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 778, 783
(2004)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Potterat et al., supra note 152, at 783).
156. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9.
157. Id. at 62.
158. Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16.
159. REPORT, supra note 131, at 35.
160. Meredith Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure of the Underground
Commercial Sex Economy in Eight Major US Cities, URBAN INST. 2 (Mar. 2014),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413047-Estimating-
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lishing a relationship of trust with potential victims – he falsely promises
marriage, family, and love.161 After the victim becomes dependent on the
perpetrator, he then manipulates her into the commercial sex trade, using
methods such as locking her in a room, forcing her to witness violence perpetrated on others, depriving her of movement, and emotionally abusing, shaming, or neglecting her as a means to intimidate and punish.162 Victims report
their traffickers control the money the victims earn; victims become dependent on the traffickers’ support for food, clothes, and shelter.163 These methods become tantamount to torture for the women involved.164
The common lack of understanding of how psychological coercion
augments physical violence presents significant obstacles for prosecutors.165
Misperceptions by judges and juries that the victim was complicit in her victimization, or at the very least failed to leave her trafficker, persuade factfinders that the defendant did not commit a crime.166 Rather than recognizing
victims of sex trafficking, courts will chastise victims for their sexual exploitations, often sending them back into the clutches of their traffickers.167 It is
this same lack of understanding that led the Fourth Circuit to its uninformed
decision in Fuertes.

B. Sex Trafficking as a Violent Crime Under the Residual Clause
The Fuertes court concluded sex trafficking did not present a substantial
risk of physical violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).168 The court refused to
apply other circuit courts’ analyses of sex trafficking statutes to the instant
case.169 While the court emphasized that the decision relied on the defendant’s conduct in the ordinary case of sex trafficking, it failed to investigate
such statistics.170 An analysis of both other circuits’ decisions and crime statistics reveals that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is unconvincing.

the-Size-and-Structure-of-the-Underground-Commercial-Sex-Economy-in-EightMajor-US-Cities.PDF.
161. Walker-Rodriguez & Hill, supra note 134.
162. REPORT, supra note 131, at 36.
163. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 51, 58.
164. REPORT, supra note 131, at 36.
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 36.
167. See Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16.
168. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 499–501 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016).
169. See id. at 500.
170. See id.
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1. The Substantial Risk of Violence at the Hands of Johns: The Circuit
Courts’ Imputation of the Easily Foreseen Risk to the Trafficker
The First Circuit in Williams found an imbalance of power between the
adult and child because a child is smaller, weaker, and less experienced; these
characteristics inherently lead to the use of force.171 The same power imbalance can also be found in a majority of adult sex trafficking cases. Traffickers, by nature, target vulnerable persons.172 Women and girls with few economic opportunities, struggling to meet basic needs, make easy prey for traffickers.173 Perpetrators look for specific indicators when finding victims,
such as poverty, young age, limited education, lack of work opportunities,
lack of family support, history of sexual abuse, and health and mental challenges.174
One study found 73% of trafficked international women had very little
to no English language skills.175 The same study found the majority of both
domestic and international female victims entered the sex industry before the
age of twenty-five, many of them as children.176 It is clear the power imbalance is not just found in sex trafficking of minors but also in sex trafficking
generally.177 As such, the Fuertes court should have recognized the inherent
risk of physical violence that accompanies such asymmetric power.
The First Circuit’s finding of an imbalance of power in child sex trafficking cases led to its conclusion that sex trafficking of a minor is a crime of
violence, in part because the trafficker “necessarily placed the minor in
harm’s way and led ineluctably to a sex act . . . between the minor and an
older man unconcerned with her welfare.”178 The Sixth Circuit in Willoughby
mirrored this conclusion, finding a § 1591 conviction is a crime of violence
because of the risk of physical injury from johns.179
The government argued the same reasoning applied in Williams and
Willoughby should also apply to the sex trafficking of adults, but the Fourth

171. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998)).
172. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10 (Aug. 30, 2009),
aspe.hhs.gov/report/human-trafficking-and-within-united-states-review-literature
[hereinafter HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN].
173. Id. at 7.
174. Id.
175. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 7.
176. Id.
177. HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN, supra note 172, at 7–11.
178. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008).
179. United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014).
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Circuit rejected this position.180 The Fourth Circuit claimed the U.S.S.G.
§4B1.2 residual clause at issue in Willoughby was more expansive than the
residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B); while §4B1.2 simply requires
“conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”
the court reasoned § 924(c) asks “whether there is a substantial risk that the
defendant will use physical force against the victim in completing the
crime.”181
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit in Keelan found differently; it rejected the defendant’s argument that § 16(b), the same language used in § 924(c),
was narrower than §4B1.2.182 Prior to Keelan, the court had deduced that
there was no “substantial difference that requires a different decision between
the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 . . . and the definition of a crime of violence for career offender purposes under [U.S.S.G.
§4B1.2].”183 In keeping with this conclusion, the court found sex trafficking
of a minor to be a violent crime under both §4B1.2 and § 16(b).184 Seen from
this interpretation, the Willoughby court’s conclusion that a claim for sex
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion is a crime of violence under §4B1.2
should also apply to crime of violence clauses in § 16(b) and § 924(c).185
The Fourth Circuit attempted to dissuade legal readers from accepting
this argument by considering Keelan in a footnote.186 The court claimed Keelan applies only to child sex crimes and is therefore inapplicable to the instant
case.187 Yet the statute used to convict the defendant in Keelan does not contain any element of physical force.188 Instead, the statute requires the government to prove the defendant knowingly “persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d],
or coerce[d]” a minor to engage in sexual activity.189 Undeterred, the Keelan
court held substantial risk of physical force will always exist when a child
complies with an adult’s sexual demands.190 Conversely, despite the statute’s

180. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016); Brief of Appellee United
States of America, supra note 23, at 39.
181. Id. at 499–500.
182. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 870–72 (11th Cir. 2015).
183. United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 1999). See also
United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] crime of violence
determination for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is indistinguishable from a determination made pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.”).
184. Keelan, 786 F.3d at 870, 872.
185. This conclusion is supported by recent circuit courts’ statements. See supra
Part III.A (residual clauses in § 16(b) and U.S.S.G. §4K1.2 are unconstitutionally
vague after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Johnson).
186. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500 n.6.
187. Id.
188. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2012).
189. § 2422(b).
190. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2015).
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express listing of force and threats of force as possible elements, the Fourth
Circuit declined to accept Keelan’s reasoning.191
The Fourth Circuit viewed the adult-minor distinction as dispositive,
yet, as mentioned earlier, adult victims are similarly subjected to the imbalanced power dynamic that is seen in child sex trafficking.192 Moreover, force
is a specific element of the statute for adult sex trafficking.193 The court’s
view that adult sex trafficking cannot be a violent crime because the defendant merely places the victim in harmful situations and does not harm the victims directly is contrary to both prior holdings on sex trafficking and the interpretations of various residual clauses.194

2. Substantial Risk of Violence by the Trafficker Himself
The Fourth Circuit emphasized the relevant question in Fuertes was
whether there was a substantial risk the defendant would use physical force
against the victim in a sex trafficking crime.195 The court relied on the example in Leocal v. Ashcroft, which reasoned, “burglary, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing
the crime.”196 While the Fourth Circuit considered the risk of physical violence at the hands of a trafficker’s clientele, it failed to analyze the potential
for physical harm at the hands of the trafficker himself.
Analyzing the established violent crime of burglary under the “substantial risk of physical force” standard is illuminating. Traditionally, burglary is
considered to be a property crime against another, defined as “a breaking and
entering of a dwelling house of another at night with the intent to commit a
felony therein.”197 Yet burglary has long been considered a crime of violence
by the federal court system.198 It has been proffered, “Perhaps it is the fact
that other crimes might occur after a burglar enters a building, and that those
crimes might be violent, that has resulted in the categorization of burglary as
a violent offense when the law requires that criminal record be used for sentencing enhancement.”199
Yet a 2015 analysis of burglaries occurring between 1998 and 2007 revealed that fewer than 8% resulted in physical violence or threats of physical

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500 n.6.
Id. at 496.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a) (West 2016).
Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500.
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 500 (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004)).
Richard F. Culp, Phillip M. Kopp & Candace McCoy, Is Burglary a Crime of
Violence? An Analysis of National Data 1998–2007, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE
SERV. 2 (Feb. 2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248651.pdf (quoting
Burglary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
198. Id. at 3.
199. Id. at viii–ix.
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violence.200 The highest estimate of actual violence occurring during burglaries, as indicated by physical injuries to a victim, was only 2.7%.201 Strikingly, courts have found that even if a victim did not know a burglar entered the
building until after the property was discovered missing, the burglary is still a
violent crime due to the risk of violence.202 It is reasonable to conclude from
these statistics that a “substantial risk of violence” for residual clause purposes is a relatively low threshold.203
When comparing the potential for physical harm between burglary and
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, empirical data show a tremendous
difference between the rates of violence.204 Studies typically find between 80
and 90% of sex trafficking victims experience violence at the hands of their
traffickers.205 One study concluded up to 90% of women received verbal
threats of violence from their traffickers.206 Compared to these numbers, the
risk of physical violence in a burglary is quite paltry. Despite these statistics,
the Fourth Circuit found the risk of violence by a burglar to be sufficient for a
crime of violence determination and failed to even consider the risk of violence by a sex trafficker to his victim.207 Instead, the court dismissed the
argument in a footnote.208
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit adjudged sex trafficking by
force, fraud, or coercion to fulfill the residual clause definition for a crime of
violence.209 The Willoughby court specifically pointed to the risk of violence
from the pimp “regardless of whether the pimp use[d] force to cause his victim to engage in a sex act.”210 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged what the empirical data prove: “[T]here is always a serious risk that [the pimp] will use
force afterward, if she disobeys his rules, fails to obtain a client, or for any
number of reasons.”211 This is in keeping with other circuits, which have
found sex trafficking of a minor involves risks of physical harm to be suffi200. Id. at x. This number represents burglaries in urban areas. Id. at ii. For rural
areas, the likelihood for violence and threats of violence is less than 1%. Id.
201. Id. at ii.
202. Id. at viii.
203. Id. at ii. Researchers agree, surmising it is “clear that the majority of burglaries do not involve physical violence and scarcely even present the possibility of
physical violence.” Id.
204. Id. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9.
205. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9.
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 n.6 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e
are not persuaded that the ordinary case of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion
involves a substantial risk that the defendant will use physical force as a means to
commit the offense.”), cert. denied sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1220 (2016).
208. See id.
209. United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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cient for purposes of a crime of violence.212 The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is
inconsistent with reliable data and contrary to the thoughtful interpretations
of other courts.
Due to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Fuertes, prosecutors are not likely
to bring 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) claims, instead using the Sentencing Guidelines
to further the goal of reducing guns in the commission of violent crimes.213
One possible option in the Fuertes case would be to ask for a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, which raises a defendant’s sentencing
range if a defendant used, possessed, or transported a firearm.214 While most
sentencing enhancements under this guideline require a conviction under §
924(c), a prosecutor can bring a sentencing enhancement under §2K2.1(a)(5),
as it simply requires the instant offense to involve a firearm.215
This strategy has its limitations. Section 2K2.1(a)(5) restricts the application of the Sentencing Guidelines only to specific guns outlined in 26
U.S.C. § 5845(a).216 The types of guns found in this section include sawedoff shotguns and modified rifles, machine guns, and explosives.217 It also
includes “any weapon or device capable of being concealed on the person
from which a shot can be discharged.”218 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms lists devices such as pen guns, cigarette lighter guns, knife guns,
can guns, and umbrella guns.219 This definition also includes pistols and revolvers having smooth bore barrels.220 In other words, § 5845 only applies to
illegal guns and excludes many types of guns people are allowed to purchase
for use at home or hunting.221 The possibility for the prosecutor to obtain a
sentencing enhancement through §2K2.1 therefore fails to capture all criminals, including sex traffickers, who use legally obtained guns. The best way
212. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is
surpassingly difficult to see how burglary could be treated as a violent crime yet child
trafficking exempted.”); United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he government is correct that violation of the statute creates a significant risk of
violence against the victim by the perpetrator . . . .”); United States v. Keelan, 786
F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Since the conduct encompassed by the elements of §
2422(b) involves a sex crime against a minor, the ordinary or generic violation of §
2422(b) involves a substantial risk the defendant may use physical force in the course
of committing the offense.”).
213. Telephone Interview with Teresa Moore, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Missouri (Feb. 8, 2016).
214. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2K2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5845(e) (2012).
219. What Are “Firearms” Under the NFA?, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, &
FIREARMS § 2.1.5, at 7, https://www.atf.gov/file/58196/download (last visited Jan. 15,
2017).
220. Id.
221. § 5845.
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to effectively punish a defendant for the possession or use of a gun in a sex
trafficking crime is to proceed under the residual clause of § 924(c).
It is difficult to fathom how the court could consider burglary, with statistically low rates of violence, to be a violent crime, while disqualifying sex
trafficking as a violent crime, when so many trafficked victims face violence
at the hands of their traffickers. Similarly, the court’s conclusion – that traffickers are not responsible for the harm committed against their victims when
they use their superior power to place vulnerable women at risk – is nonsensical. This decision is illustrative of the general factfinders’ lack of education
on this issue. The best approach for prosecutors is not to find alternative
methods to effectively punish sex traffickers, but rather to educate factfinders
on the power dynamics and methods of control used by traffickers, including
the common use of force and threat of force as a means of domination.
Because sex trafficking victims face substantial odds of violence, sex
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion should be considered a crime of violence under the several residual clauses. However, what happens if the several residual clauses are found to be unconstitutionally vague and stricken from
statutes?

C. Thinking Ahead: Can Congress Ensure Sex Trafficking Is Considered a Violent Crime?
Even if the Fourth Circuit had found committing sex trafficking by
force, fraud, or coercion to be a crime of violence under the residual clause,
the circuit courts’ holdings since United States v. Johnson would call into
question the instant decision’s constitutionality. While § 924(c)’s residual
clause has yet to be found in violation of due process, circuit courts have declared its sister clause, § 16(b), to be unconstitutionally vague.222 The government may be precluded from using § 924(c)’s residual clause in the future,
requiring the prosecutor to satisfy § 924(c)’s force clause.
Unfortunately, sex trafficking cannot qualify as a crime of violence under 924(c)’s force clause. The elements of the sex trafficking statute require
the crime to be committed by force, fraud, or coercion. Thus, in theory, the
crime could be committed by fraudulent means alone, making the statute
applicable to both non-violent and violent instances. The broad interpretations of this statute, while helpful when convicting sex traffickers, make it
difficult to fit sex trafficking within the force clause.223 As currently constructed, the statute leaves prosecutors unable to charge sex trafficking defendants under § 924(c), evading the effective justice espoused by the TVPA.
However, an informed analysis of sex trafficking as a violent crime requires a closer look into the congressional findings under the TVPA. Under
this statute, Congress declared, “Trafficking includes all elements of the
222. See supra note 75 (listing the various circuit courts’ decisions on the constitutionality of residual clauses).
223. See Telephone Interview with Teresa Moore, supra note 213.
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crime of forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of another person in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion.”224 Forcible
rape automatically includes the necessary requirement to qualify as a crime of
violence: force or threat of force.225 Because a finding of force, fraud, or
coercion qualifies as forcible rape, a conviction of sex trafficking should be
considered a crime of violence, regardless of which elements were proven in
the actual conviction. While the government presented such an argument, the
court did not address it in the published opinion.226 In oral argument, the
court was reluctant to allow the TVPA’s “legislative history” to inform its
interpretation of crime of violence.227
The idea that congressional findings are simply “legislative history”
minimizes the legitimate purpose they serve.228 The government argued as
much, asserting that the findings in the TVPA were “enacted text that satisfied the bicameralism and presentment requirements of [the U.S. Constitution], and thus have the force of law.”229 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with this interpretation, claiming congressional findings to be “part of the
statute.”230 Congress creates its findings to “inform” the court’s interpretation, and the court’s decision must be “in harmony” with such findings.231
Any other interpretation would clearly violate the TVPA’s stated purpose to
“ensure just and effective punishment of [sex] traffickers.”232
Nevertheless, circuit courts may continue to diminish the importance of
Congress’s TVPA findings. Congress must clarify its intention to hold sex
trafficking as a violent crime. The best possible solution is to insert language
into the criminal sex trafficking statute that equates sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion to forcible rape. This addition to the statute seems to align
with the original intent of the legislature; the application of the same terms in
the criminal and congressional statute make clear the legislature meant to
equate a conviction of sex trafficking under § 1591 with forcible rape.233 By
224. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(9) (2012) (emphasis added).
225. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 580 (7th ed. 2015)

(“The traditional rule is that a successful prosecution for forcible rape requires proof
that the female did not consent to the intercourse and that the sexual intercourse was
secured by force.”).
226. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, at 1, United States v. Fuertes, 805
F.3d 485 (Nos. 13-4755(L), 13-4816), 2015 WL 4638635. See generally, United
States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Ventura v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016).
227. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, supra note 226 at 1.
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id. at 1.
230. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989).
231. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, supra note 227, at 2 (citing Dig.
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994)).
232. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012).
233. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (“The ‘normal rule of
statutory construction’ [is] that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act
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expressly placing the language in the statute, courts would more likely find
that sex trafficking qualifies as a categorical crime of violence under the force
clause.

VI. CONCLUSION
In the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, “Master
Ed” of Lebanon, Missouri, pled guilty to his eleven-count indictment, including a charge for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.234 The federal judge sentenced Edward Bagley to twenty years’ imprisonment.235 However, the recent Fourth Circuit decision in United States
v. Fuertes is a strong deterrent for federal prosecutors around the country,
likely preventing them from additionally charging sex traffickers under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). Instead of a twenty-year sentence, traffickers like Bagley
would receive a fifteen-year sentence. This is not the outcome Congress intended when it wrote the TVPA and is contrary to its stated purpose of combatting trafficking and protecting victims.236
The Fourth Circuit’s decision reflects the lack of education general factfinders receive about the violence and manipulation wielded by traffickers.
Studies show both traffickers and their clients expose their victims to a substantial risk of violence.237 While the Fourth Circuit’s judgment that, contrary to data, sex trafficking does not present a substantial risk of violence is
inappropriate, it may carry insignificant weight in the future due to the questionable constitutionality of the residual clause. As such, the best solution is
for Congress to directly insert in the criminal statute what it already explicitly
states in the TVPA’s findings: sex trafficking includes all elements of forcible
rape. Only then will traffickers be ensured just and effective punishment.

are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994))). See also United States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 357–
58 (4th Cir. 2015) (“‘[F]orcible sex offenses’ is a distinct term with a consistent
meaning across §§ 2L1.2 and 4B1.2.”).
234. Lebanon Man Guilty, Faces 20 Years in Prison for Coercing a Minor to
Become a Sex Slave, DOJ (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usaowdmo/pr/human-traficking-rescue-project-0.
235. Lebanon Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Coercing a Minor to Become a Sex
Slave, FBI (Sept. 11, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/kansascity/pressreleases/2013/lebanon-man-sentenced-to-20-years-for-coercing-a-minor-to-become-asex-slave.
236. § 7101(a).
237. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9.
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